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THIS paper examines some organizational aspects of military R and
D decision making. For the purposes of our discussion we visualize
R and D as a continuous spectrum of activities that can for expository
purposes be divided into discrete steps, as follows:
Step I. The formation and empirical verification of theories about
parameters of the physical world.
Step II. The creation and testing of radically new physical com-
ponents, devices, and techniques.
Step III. The identification, modification, and combination of
existing components and devices to provide a distinctly new applica-
tion practical in terms of performance, reliability, and cost.
Step IV. Relatively minor modification of existing components,
devices, and systems to improve performance, increase reliability,
reduce cost, and simplify application.'
For those who like a more conventional terminology step I can be
equated with basic science, step II with applied research, step III with
advanced engineering and development, and step IV with engineering.
Since several of the papers presented in this volume are concerned
with the nature of these steps and their interaction, we shall not
discuss them in any detail here.
It is commonly said that the technical problems of weaponry are
increasing. Certainly, two changes distinguish the post-Korean pro-
jects from those of 1946 to 1949. First, step I and II activities play a
larger role in the missile and supersonic aircraft developments of the
1950's, although the bulk of the effort remains in stage 111. Second,
the effort at stage Ill has become more complex.
In this kind of technical environment, the crucial decision to initiate
a weapons program, to provide for its funding, and to administer its
execution can be formulated in terms of two kinds of considerations.
1Thistabulation is adopted from David Novick, "What Do We Mean By Research
and Development," Illinois Business Review, November 1959.
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First, what is the relationship between cost in terms of both dollars
and time and the performance of the weapon, that is, what might
be called the development possibility function. Second, what is
military utility or value of various combinations of cost, time, and
performance. Conceptually, it is apparent that the decisions in weap-
ons projects are identical to those in the theory of the firm. But in
view of the great uncertainties involved a purely formalistic and static
analysis would tell us very little about how weapons projects are
administered.
The approach we have been assigned is to examine some of the
aspects of the organizational framework for weapons projects. Each
of the various groups involved can be viewed as one element or force
in the decision process that we ordinarily visualize as taking place
inside the skull of an idealized decision maker. In this way, we can
distinguish some of the factors that underlie a complex development
decision.
Patterns of Organization
Having set forth the several levels of research and development, it is
appropriate to examine the pattern of organization within which
decisions concerning them are made. Figure 1sets forth a highly
simplified, over-all organizational chart, using the Air Force by way
of illustration. This chart shows all of the major groups that are apt
to become involved in a decision to go ahead with a step III develop-
ment project for a major (and probably controversial) system. A
decision involving a step I research project would probably involve
many fewer groups and perhaps only some subunit of the Air Research
and Development Command, which would enter into a contract for
a few thousand dollars with a university, specifying that one or two
individuals would work in a fairly broad area.
For present purposes, we shall confine our attention to a decision
to begin serious development of a major weapon system (step III).
There are a number of ways in which such a development may be
initiated. A contractor may propose it. It may result from a special
study by a group such as the RAND Corporation. It may be proposed
by a subunit of either the ARDC or an operating command. But the
first formal document proposing development of such a system prob-
ably originates in the headquarters development staff.
Various development possibilities and their military value are
appraised and integrated into a program recommendation by the
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headquarters research and development staff of the particular military
service. Participating in these determinations are civilian counter-
parts in the offices of the service secretary and perhaps the Secre-
tary of Defense. Enformation and often complete recommendations
are obtained from the service's procurement and research agencies,
from commands which will use the proposed weapon system, from
industrial contractors, and from a variety of independent groups.
Several hundred persons are apt to have a hand in the process of
coordinating and clearing the development proposal through the
numerous offices in Washington and the field. These are not ultimate
decision makers, but some of them may help to shape the ultimate
decision.
The location of the crucial decision to proceed with a development
program depends upon the quantity of resources required, the degree
of certainty attached to cost and military value expectations, the
relationship of the particular program to programs of other agencies,
the extent to which overall national policy is affected, and many other
elements. Most program decisions are formally made by the service
secretary upon the recommendation of the military chief. However,
if neither of the two revises the recommendations of his staff, who has
made the decision? And decisions of the services can be altered or
overruled by the Secretary of Defense and his staff. When top national
policy is involved, weapons development decisions have been passed
up to the President, e.g.it was President Roosevelt's decision to
develop the atomic bomb and President Truman's decision to move
forward into the hydrogen bomb.
What can be stated is that the program decision is a function of the
United States executive branch. The Congress has on occasion attemp-
ted unsuccessfully to cancel programs (such as the Air Force's Mace
guided missile) and to have programs initiated (such as its efforts to
accelerate development of a nuclear propelled bomber). But its
power over program decisions must be exercised mainly through per-
suasion (a not insignificant factor) and through broad budgetary
controls.2
This suggests another aspect of the program decision—the deter-
mination of resource levels, usually in dollar terms, once the program
has been approved. Again, the locus of program decisions is not
2Foran excellentdiscussion of the U.S. organization for weapons program decision
making,see HearingsonOrganization and Management of Missile Programs, HR.
Committee on Government Operations, 11th Report, 1959, especially pp. 151—152.
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easilydescribed. Initial program budgets are usually prepared by
military procurement agencies on the basis of information submitted
by contractors. The budgets are then revised successively by the ser-
vice headquarters staff, by the service secretary's comptroller and
research and development staffs, by the Secretary of Defense's staff,
by the Bureau of the Budget, and finally by Congress.3 Even when
Congress makes its annual appropriation, the level of spending on
any one program is not absolutely determined, for the executive
agencies can withhold money (as was done in the Polaris and Nike
Zeus programs, to cite only two instances) and can divert money from
other categories to conduct programs for which funds were not
appropriated (as in the Mace case4).
In sum, very many hands and heads participate in any weapon
system program decision, with the result being a lengthy and complex
decision making chain. Almost inevitably the chain will include both
advocates and skeptics, and an important dissent can seriously delay
a program considered urgent by others. These characteristics of
the U.S. program decision making process have been studied and
criticized repeatedly in recent years. As retired Lt. General James M.
Gavin, former chief of the Army Office of Research and Develop-
ment, wrote,
It has been the decisions that have been, at times, shockingly
in error, not only the decisions themselves, but their tardiness.
And the principal object of any reorganization now should be to
accelerate and improve the quality of the decision-making pro-
cesses.5
Nevertheless, as noted earlier, our immediate object is simply to point
out the economic features and problems of the program decision
making process, not to recommend specific corrections. To that end
it is particularly useful to look for a moment at the terminal links in
the decision chain: the information inputs at one end and the final
decision making locus at the other end.
Let us begin by considering the final decision locus. Critics of the
'Cf. HearingsonResearch and Development,H.R. Committee on Government
Operations,32ndreport,1958, especially pp.100—102 andpp. 116—146.
Cf. HearingsonOrganization and Management of Missile Programs, op.cit., p.65. 'Warand Peace in the Space Age, New York, Harper, 1958, p. 163 if. Other examples
include the Rockefeller Report, International Security: The Military Aspect, Garden
City, Doubleday, I 958, pp. 27—35; and the Robertson Report.
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weapons decision making process have often questioned the need for
secretarial reviews and concurrences. However, analysis of commer-
cially sponsored developments suggests that their wonderment may
be misdirected—it is perhaps more amazing that so much authority
is delegated to generals and assistant secretaries. Even in the largest
U.S. corporations, projects involving more than roughly $100,000
are critically evaluated by at least a vice-president, and often by the
company's president and board of directors. Yet, in contrast, Air
Force weapon system project officers (usually lieutenant colonels)
have authority to approve program changes involving up to $350,000,
and the Air Research and Development Command can begin new
programs costing up to $1 million and authorize program changes
worth up to $5 million on its own initiative. Major weapons pro-
grams, however, involve tens to hundreds of millions of dollars. The
interest of top Pentagon decision makers when these sums are at stake
is not surprising.6 The significant question is not whether these top
officials should be interested; it is whether they are in a position to
comprehend the full range of issues involved in a technically com-
plex program decision. But this matter must be deferred until the
issues themselves are better defined.
Turning to the inputs of information for such decisions, most of
the various groups shown in Figure I add information about strategic
worth and technical feasibility. Two outside groups, the weapons
contractors and the scientific advisory committees, deserve some
special attention at this point.
Role of Contractors
In recent years, private contractors have taken an active part both
as sources of information and as advocates of the weapons develop-
ment in which they participate. With respect to the former role, con-
tractors are perhaps the most important source of new weapons
ideas.7 Besides ideas, they provide information on the technological
feasibility of new concepts and data on estimated development costs
CInother nations weapons acquisition decisions are also matters of top-level interest,
often at the expense of rapid decision making. For one account of delayed top-level
decisions, see "Swiss Fighter Choice Referred to Council," AviationWeek,October 26,
1959, p. 103.
Cf. the testimony of Air Force Association president Peter J. Schenk in Hearingson
Employment of Retired Military arid Civilian Personnel by Defense Industries, Sub-
committee for Special Investigations of the H.R. Committee on Armed Services,
p. 396; and the Robertson Report.
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and schedules—the basic elements of what we have called the develop-
ment possibility map. In addition, practically every major weapon
system prime contractor has an operations analysis group which
studies the military value of new weapons possibilities—the other
half of our theoretical program decision model.
Such contractor furnished information could be a valuable input
into the program decision making process. On occasion, however,
advocacy becomes mixed with education in unwholesome propor-
tions. Particularly troublesome are unrealistic cost and time estimates
submitted to "sell" a company's proposals. Moreover, contractors
are so prolific in generating new weapons proposals that frequently
the ideas are not fully evaluated by military planners who lack the
time or perseverance required to plow through the chaff for a few
kernels of wheat. As a result, even though contractors are potentially
the best source of information on weapons possibilities, the admix-
ture of advocacy with information prevents realization of the source's
full value.
Of considerably less significance to the program decision making
process, but of apparently greater public concern, are the efforts of
contractors to promote their programs through public communica-
tions media and personal selling. The full-page advertisements pur-
chased by producers of the competing Bomarc and Nike Hercules
antiaircraft guided missiles provoked President Eisenhower to utter
his much-quoted comment in 1959 about the "munitions lobby."8 A
House of Representatives committee termed such advertising "danger-
ous and unhealthy."9 The same committee conducted extensive
investigations into the employment of retired military officers by de-
fense contractors for the purpose of their sales contacts and into the
entertainment of military decision makers by contractors.'° A more
subtle means for generating widespread interest in specific weapons
programs are company press releases (approved, of course, by the
military agencies) describing in detail technical features and accom-
plishments of their development efforts." Such releases are published
8New York Times, June4,1959, p.14. The advertisementsappeared in leading
Washington, D.C.,and New Yorknewspapers on April 8 and 21, and May 27, 1959.
°Hearings on Employment ofRetired Commissioned Officers, p. 15.
10Ibid.; and also by the same Subcommittee, Supplemental Hearings Released from
Executive Session Relating to Entertainment, Furnished by the Martin Company of
Baltimore, Md., of U.S. Government Officers, 1959.
11 See, for example, the rash of optimistic articles on the Titan ICBM development in
the January 11 and 18, 1960, issues of A viation Week and the January 25 issue of Missiles
and Rockets, just when the Titan program entered a period of crisis, with cancellation
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readily by trade magazines anxious to report the newest develop-
ments in their fields, and the result is a substantial literature on other-
wise secret weapons programs.
It must be said in fairness that much of the advocacy surrounding
U. S. weapons programs is not of a malicious or mercenary sort. Both
contractors and sponsoring services usually have a genuine belief that
their weapons programs are essential to the national defense. If this
sincerity does not come from pride in invention, it soon develops just
as a result of constantly living with the idea. However, selling a new
program to all the skeptics in a decision making chain is not easy.
Indeed, history shows that were it not for zealous advocacy, many new
military developments would never have received approval until it
was too late. Under these circumstances, personal contact with "the
right people" is an effective means of getting ideas accepted. Similarly,
creating public demand for a program through advertising and feature
articles is a way of winning over or bypassing balky decision makers.
Nevertheless, there is a deep-seated presumption in the United States
that the government (perhaps unlike private consumers) should not
be "sold" on new weapons; that it is intelligent enough to recognize its
needs and make rational decisions without coaxing.
Use of Scientific Consultants
Given the tendency for advocacy to creep into the presentations of
both contractors and sponsoring military agencies, and recognizing
their own inability to deal with the vast array of technical questions
in weapons program decisions, top military and civilian officials have
felt the need for some objective source of creative ideas and technical
evaluation. One solution has been the widespread employment of
professional scientists as special consultants to the government.
Beginning with the National Defense Research Committee formed in
1940 (the group that sponsored the Manhattan Project and the Radia-
tion Laboratory), the scientific advisory committee has come to play
a truly significant role in U. S. weapons decisions. After World War
II, the counsel of leading scientists and engineers was instrumental
in the decision not to promote the development of ballistic missiles
and later (when a committee of scientists predicted the breakthrough
in hydrogen warhead technology) in the decision to develop ballistic
under serious consideration, after several highly unsuccessful tests. On the program's
uncertain position at the time, cf. "Martin Girds for Titan Crisis," Business Week,
January 9, 1960, p. 69.
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missiles with maximum urgency. Scientific advisory committees simi-
larly influenced decisions to undertake the Polaris submarine launched
ballistic missile development, not to cancel (in 1959) the Bomarc
antiaircraft guided missile program, to proceed cautiously on the Nike
Zeus anti-missile project, and to proceed with or abandon a variety
of other weapons developments. By 1960, practically no high-level
weapons decision maker was without a full complement of standing
and ad hoc scientific advisory committees.'2
The role of scientific consultants and advisory committees in pro-
gram decisions can be stated in terms of a theoretical program decision
model. First, they determine whether or not a weapon system of cer-
tain technical characteristics is feasible or not (whether or not a
development possibility curve exists); second, they assess the develop-
mént cost and time required to obtain weapons of those character-
istics (estimating the position and shape of our development possi-
bility curves); and third, they make independent technical evaluations
of the strategic worth of proposed weapon systems (building up what
we have called the military value function).
Naturally, not all scientific advisory committees perform all of
these functions, and when they do, they do not perform them equally
well. Such committees appear to be most useful in appraising the
technical feasibility of proposed weapon systems, that is, in judging
whether given systems can be developed or not. In this role the
scientist's familiarity with the fringes of the state of the art is a valuable
asset. But in projecting development costs and schedules, either ab
initio or through the evaluation of contractor submissions, the scientist
often has less to offer. The reason why is summarized from testimony
of guided missile and satellite expert Werner von Braun:
It is helpful to have a scientific advisory committee at a time
when you kick the question around whether a certain proposal
is sound or desirable and in the country's interest and whether
the performance promises made are sound, and so forth.
But the missile business, particularly once a missile project really
gets going, involves many questions which are, I would say, non-
12Fora chronological "who's who" of committees in the guided missile field from 1950
through 1959, see Hearings on Organization and Management of Missile Programs,
op. cii., 1959, pp. 7 12—777. A more compact 1957 list appears in Hearings on Inquiry into
Satellite and Missile Programs, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee, 1958, pp. 352—355. The contributions of scientific advisory
committees are described at length in Hearings on Organization and Management of
Missile Programs, 1959, op. cit., especially pp. 12—15 and 69—74.
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scientific in nature; they have something to do with project
management or time schedules. For example, a physics professor
may know alot about the upper atmosphere, but when it comes to
making a sound appraisal of what missile schedu[e is sound and
how you can phase a research and development program into
industrial production, he is pretty much at a loss....Ibelieve
an established missile program, like the Jupiter, has much more
similarity with an industrial planning job than with a scientific
project....Iwould say [Jupiter] was 90 per cent engineering
and 10 per cent scientific, and in these scientific areas we love
scientific advice.13
Recognizing the value of scientific advice both in broad feasibility
evaluations and detailed problem areas, von Braun nonetheless sug-
gested a more fundamental reason for the proliferation of scientific
advisory committees:
Sir, there are many areas where we even go to them and ask
for their advice, but I think to expect a scientist to have all the
answers to everything—my personal feeling, to be frank about
this, is as follows: I believe that the prestige factor plays a very
important part in these things. When confronted with a difficult
decision involving several hundred million dollars, and of vital
importance to the national defense, many Pentagon executives
like to protect themselves. It helps if a man can say, "1 have on
my advisory committee some Nobel prizewinners, or some very
famous people that everybody knows." And if these famous
people then sign a final recommendation, the executive feels,
"Now, if something goes wrong, nobody can blame me for not
having asked the smartest men in the country what they think
about this."4
Even in the assessment of technological feasibility, the task of a
scientific advisor is not as narrow as one might imagine. There is a
tendency to think of the state of the art as something very objective—
either an accomplishment is technologically possible or it is not, and
that is all there is to it. But, more frequently, this is not so. There are
Hearingson Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, op. Cit.,pp.591, 592, 589,
and 590. The order of the comments has been rearranged.
14Ibid.,p. 591.
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two major factors: whether a given accomplishment is possible for the
best group of scientists and engineers available; and whether a given
group can accomplish the task. What is quite possible for one develop-
ment group to accomplish may be extremely difficult for another
development group, merely because the former group is more com-
petent or has specialized experience. There are wide variations in
competence between development groups both within individual com-
panies and between firms. Consequently, a good technical feasibility
evaluation must consider not only the state of the art in a very objec-
tive sense, but also the competence, insight, motivation, and other
characteristics of those who propose to develop the weapon. By
failing to include these latter subjective elements, some scientific
advisory committees have missed the mark badly in their evaluations.
Organizational Influences
The foregoing discussion is perhaps sufficient to illustrate the enor-
nious complexity of the structure through which R and D decisions
must pass when major step Ill projects are involved. But there are a
number of additional influences that are brought to bear on the final
decision that have their antecedents in the organizational structure.
They may not be immediately apparent from an examination of the
formal organizational chart. These may be briefly summarized as
(I) objectivity versus confidence, (2) the influence of the operators,
(3) the level of priority, (4) the fit with roles and missions and, (5) the
influence of external forces.
OBJECTIVITY VERSUS CONFIDENCE
When the state of the art is uncertain, weapons decisions must often
be based on interpersonal confidence rather than objective analysis.'5
The history of technology is replete with situations where innovations
were supported not because the underlying logic was overwhelming
but because someone with funds believed in someone with an idea.'6
One illustration of the influence of "confidence" will suffice. A
situation involving hundreds of millions of dollars is to be found in
15Alongthe same line but in a more traditional vein, see F. H. Knight, who observes
that thebasicproblem of organizational responsibility and control is judging men's
powers ofjudgment, not (he facts of the situation (Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Boston,
Houghton Muffin, 1921, p. 292).
16Thereare also sufficient examples of failure under these conditions to provide one
explanation of the tendency of program decision makers to gain assurance from several
sources.
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the conflict over whether the Nike Zeus antimissile missile system
should be produced. Critics of the program in top decision making
positions feared that, because of technological uncertainties, the
system would not meet its performance promises or that the develop-
ment would not be completed on schedule. Nevertheless, the Army
had "tremendous confidence" in the system, largely because of the
Army's successful experience with the same development team in the
Nike Ajax and Nike Hercules programs.'7 To resolve this conflict, an
independent committee of top scientists was appointed. Published
information indicates that the committee accepted as given the
development group's performance and schedule promises, confining
its inquiry mainly to the question whether a weapon system of the
proposed performance would provide military value commensurate
with its cost.'8
iNFLUENCE OF THE OPERATORS
It is no secret that most military organizations are heavily oriented
toward immediate operational capability—how can we fight right
now. This is reflected in the fact that a chief of staff is typically an
operating or combat man and that the headquarters operations staff is
typically the most influential of the several functional staff groups.
In the process of developing a proposal for a major advanced weapons
system and pushing it through the decision making machinery, the
influence of the operators bulks large. This has the tendency—but it
is no more than that—to place emphasis on nearer-in projects and
to mean that more speculative and farther-out projects are rejected,
or are carried out as Step II component developments.
LEVEL OF PRIORITY
A major factor affecting both the level at which key decisions are
made and the speed with which they are made is the level of priority
of the project. The priority may be determined by an enemy threat,
by a technological breakthrough or possibly by a competing project
of a rival service. In the case of decisions affecting high priority pro-
17Cf.the testimony of Maj. Gen.Roberti.Wood, U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Research
andDevelopment, Hearingson Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960, H.R.
Committeeon Appropriations, Part6, page 422.The fiscal year 1959,1960,and 1961
Congressional appropriations documents abound with comments on the Nike Zeus
controversy.
18 Cf. "Defense Group EvaluatesZeusPotential," AviationWeek, November2, 1959,
p. 30; and "Zeus Delayed by Technical Doubt, Budget," Aviation Week, February 8,
1960, p.32.
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jects, the organizational machinery can be, and often is, made to work
with considerable rapidity. Some of the steps normally undertaken
are eliminated, some of the organizational units are short-circuited,
and the ones retained are made to take coordinating action more
rapidly. It is perhaps significant that in both the Navy and the Air
Force, special organizations have been established to handle and make
key R and D decisions on high priority missile projects.
FIT WITH ROLES AND MISSIONS
Some special decisions have to be made (usually at the top level of
the service) when a project decision brings into issue the role or mis-
sion of the service. For example, in the air defense field, antiaircraft
batteries had been assigned to the Army, air defense aircraft to the
Air Force. With the advent of air defense missiles, the respective
roles and missions of the services in the air defense field became a
matter of controversy. Each service had a weapon presumably capable
of destroying enemy bombers, and the only distinguishing feature was
that the Army weapon (Nike) was a so-called point-defense weapon
while the Air Force, in the Bomare, had an "area-defense" weapon.
This distinction was not sufficient to keep the weapons from being
sharply competitive. This competition, and its potential threat to the
services' role in the air defense mission, had a considerable influence
not only on the initial R and D program decision but on a variety of
subsidiary decisions as the respective programs proceeded.
What is usually referred to as interservice rivalry often has its
origin in this type of roles and missions ambiguity. It thereupon may
become an influential factor in various R and D decisions.
INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FORCES
There are, of course, a host of external forces which tend to influence
R and D program decisions and which are the product both of the
internal organizational complex of the Department of Defense and
the services and of the relationship of the DOD to other parts of the
government. The most familiar are the budgetary influences on pro-
gram decisions as exercised by the Treasury, the Budget Bureau, the
President and, ultimately, by the Congress. But there are many others.
The decision makers may be urged to delay the announcement of
the cancellation of a major R and D program until after an election
on the grounds of political expediency. They may be urged to give a
contract for a new program to contractor A rather than contractor B
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on the grounds of a high level of unemployment in contractor A's
territory and in view of the fact that contractor A's capability is almost
on a par with B's.
The fact that such courses are urged, perhaps by powerful external
organizations, does not mean that they are automatically followed1
On the other hand, depending on the power of the external organiza-
tion, they undoubtedly receive consideration unless deemed wholly
unreasonable. The DOD and each service must, after all, live in an
environment of accommodation with other branches and agencies of
government.
It is sometimes claimed that political factors play a large role in
Rand D decisions, especially in the matter of source selection. It is our
impression that political influence on R and D decisions is greatly
overrated. But it would be absurd to deny that it is not attempted and
that it tends to complicate R and D decisions.
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